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ABSTRACT. Though seemingly cocooned by collective values, traditions, dress and 
ways of understanding, culture is inherently defined by two desires: on the one hand, 
to preserve that which is perceived to be unchanging, and on the other hand, to resist 
any change. In its purpose of preservation, it offers a haven of nostalgic comfort – a 
means through which the self finds identity. In its resistance to change, it makes 
vulnerable not only its contested nature, but also reveals that what makes it 
distinctive and exclusive might very well be its weakest point. And yet it would 
seem that, even when it includes those who resonate with its collective discourse, it 
might also exclude them on the same basis. In terms of both Muslim culture and 
religion, a Muslim woman, for example, might be perceived, and therefore 
constructed, as the custodian of family values, modesty and purity. Yet the very 
essence that designates her as the custodian of particular values – and therefore at 
the center of Muslim culture – relegates her to the periphery. While she is included 
and centrally located on the basis of what she brings in terms of her Muslim identity 
as daughter, wife and mother, she is excluded on the basis of her gender and 
sexuality – that is of being a woman. In other words, if she accepts her inclusion as a 
Muslim woman, she simultaneously has to accept her exclusion as a (Muslim) 
woman – because that is what ensured her inclusion in the first place. But what 
exactly excludes and includes her – her religion, her culture, her gender, her 
sexuality, or her education? By focusing specifically on Muslim women in South 
Africa, this article contends, firstly, that any Muslim education would necessarily be 
permeated by culture. To this end, religion and culture cannot be separated. 
Secondly, if religion and culture cannot be separated, then Muslim women, by virtue 
of receiving a Muslim education, would also be acculturated. Following this, I will 
argue that, in order for Muslim women to find a sense of inclusive-belonging, they 
would need to produce a particular form of knowledge – one that makes a 
contribution to both education and culture.  
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1. Muslim Education: A Matrimony of Religion and Culture? 
 
Traditionally, and contestably, religion has often been defined and 
understood as a particular set of institutionalized beliefs, and dogmas, 
practiced by individuals in relation to their particular understanding of God, 
gods or divinity. Like the myriad systems of beliefs, the practices, rituals, 
customs and traditions that accompany religious enactment and embodiment 
are equally numerous and complex. Smart (1984), on the one hand, describes 
religion as being constituted by seven dimensions: ritual; narrative and 
mythic; experiential and emotional; social and institutional; ethical and legal; 
doctrinal and philosophical; and material. Derrida (2002), on the other hand, 
maintains that religion is impossible without uncertainty, because religion 
never always offers clear meaning or purpose. Indeed, what disturbed 
Derrida was that all religious traditions brought into question certainty and 
faith. This would explain his assertion that faith has not always been and will 
not always be identifiable with religion, nor with theology. Moreover, says 
Yuval-Davis (2011: 116), religious discourses supply the individual, within 
specific social and historic contexts, with explicit or implicit answers to 
particular questions, which she or he might find worthwhile asking.  
If religion has generally been understood as a particular interpretation of 
a particular set of beliefs in relation to a Divine Being, then culture has been 
understood as referring to the context in which the particular set of beliefs 
plays out. While religion, says Bonney (2004: 31), might more or less be 
considered as a process of revelation and to contain the concept of the 
“faithful,” culture might be considered as a causal agent that affects the 
evolutionary process by uniquely human means. Drawing on the views of 
Gramsci, and Foucault, Yuval-Davis (2011: 115) understands cultures as 
dynamic social processes operating in contested terrains in which different 
voices become more or less hegemonic in their offered interpretations of the 
world. This recognizes, states Yuval-Davis, that cultural discourses often 
will resemble more of a battleground for meaning than a shared point of 
departure (2011: 115).  
Roy (2010: 26) conceives of culture in two ways: the production of 
symbolic systems, imaginative representations and institutions specific to a 
society; and the symbolic productions valued socially as an independent 
aesthetic category (art). In addressing the relationship between religion and 
culture, Roy (2010: 26) explains that religion is “treated by anthropologists 
and sociologists as one of several symbolic systems; it is therefore seen as an 
integral part of a given culture; it is of the culture.” The only time, he 
continues, that this understanding of religion comes up against an exception 
is when that religion refuses to be a mere system of beliefs among others, 
and instead claims to be, or state, the truth. These religions, clarifies Roy, 
consider themselves to be the bearers of a universal message that transcends 
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cultures. They therefore lay claim to a relationship with the truth that does 
not come under the heading of “culture,” since faith sets down a truth 
beyond the cultural relationship (Roy, 2010: 27).  
As do the nature mainstream religions, Islam lays claim to particular 
universal truths. In this sense it could be argued that Islam, through its 
centrally divine text, the Qur’an – through its message of social justice, truth, 
honor and compassion, for instance – might hold a particular universal 
appeal. However, this claim to universality, argues Roy (2010: 28), can only 
be fulfilled when religion claims, even abstractly, to be a-cultural – that is, 
when religion explicitly dissociates itself from culture. And yet the Qur’an is 
also very particular – both in terms of its audience, and its discourse. As 
explained by Abu Zayd (2010: 282), the Qur’an is a historical text, which 
emerged in a very particular context of 7th century Arabia, with the purpose 
of converting the then inhabitants of the Arabian Peninsula from polytheism 
to a belief in one God. The Qur’an, he explains, responded – both explicitly 
and implicitly – to a particular historical context and within a particular 
intellectual milieu. It therefore is quite possible, and necessary, to discern 
between that which can be understood as the universal component of the 
Qur’an, and that which is particular to a specific community. Of course, 
regardless of its centrality to Islam, and therefore to Muslims, the Qur’an 
cannot offer the only insight into what Islam is. As is every other religion, 
says Abu Zayd (2010: 283), Islam is the result of the interpretation and 
experiences of real people – and these people were not living in isolation 
from other communities and different forms of belief. The spread of Islam 
beyond the Arabian Peninsula meant the adoption of various religious ideas 
as well as cultural practices that have evolved into the present-day eclectic 
mix, known as Islamic cultural traditions. To Abu Zayd (2010: 284–285), 
not only did Islam originate from the Arabian Peninsula; it cannot be 
imagined without the cultural legacy of India, Iran and Indonesia, as well as 
of Hellenism. That Islam has had a relationship of mutual exchange with 
other world cultures, argues Abu Zayd, is evident in the multiple forms and 
interpretations of the religion, and therefore requires a distinction between 
the Qur’an, as a given fact, and Islam. Religion, he continues, is what people 
make of it, and in this respect Islam is no different from any other religion. 
To this end, Abu Zayd (2010: 286) maintains that “one cannot find the 
meaning of a religion in the text but in the interaction between the text and 
the historical process, in the interaction between the believer(s)/the 
communities with their holy texts.”  
Besides then, the distinctive context of the Qur’an, there is the dimension 
of what informs the education of Muslims – and that is the Sunnah, as 
constituted through the actions and words of the prophet Muhammad. Again, 
while the education of Muslims might resonate with other mainstream 
religions, most notably those couched in monotheism, Muslims are expected 
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to live in accordance with the codified life of the prophet Muhammad. And 
here it is possible to identify common traits among the prophets of the three 
monotheistic faiths of Judaism, Christianity and Islam – such as 
steadfastness, trustworthiness, piety, as well as the historical fact that all 
three faiths originated in what is known today as the Arab world. And yet, 
Muhammad’s experiences, both as a prophet and as a man, were decidedly 
different from those of Noah, Moses or Jesus, as was his human nature, and 
therefore his fallibilities – which were both recognized, and at times 
admonished, in the Qur’an. The argument being made here is, firstly, that 
Muslims draw their foundational understandings of Islam from the Qur’an, 
which, while containing a universal message of social justice and truth, also 
is very particular in terms of its discourse and an audience that was 
overwhelmingly controlled by tribal ethics, and not by state or legal systems 
as, for example, was the case with Jesus when he encountered the Roman 
empire. Secondly, Muslims are expected to emulate the actions and ideas of 
the prophet Muhammad – a man whose humanity is brought to the fore 
repeatedly in the Qur’an. What this means is that the primary sources of both 
knowledge and education are derived from strongly contextualized origins 
and particular practices. This demonstrates Roy’s (2010: 26) point that 
religion emanates from representations and institutions specific to a society, 
which, therefore, not only makes religion of the culture, but attempts to 
deculturate religion will result in the loss of the social expression of religion 
(2010: 8). Moreover, as discussed by Davids and Waghid (2014: 1490), the 
Qur’an itself proclaims to be a text for all times and places, and its 
(con)textual manifestations will always be subjected to (re)interpretations as 
Muslims endeavor to live their lives in ethical conduct and obedience to the 
dictates of its primary sources. Failing to do so, they continue, would not 
only render the primary sources superfluous, but also undermine the constant 
possibilities to think anew and to enhance the new re-beginnings so 
necessary for the advocacy of Muslim education. 
By dismissing the dichotomy between religion and culture, I am not 
arguing that the two are the same. It is of course possible to draw a 
distinction between religion as code or doctrine, and culture as ritual and 
practice. But doctrine does not find expression in doctrine; doctrine is made 
visible through lived expressions, and these lived expressions are inherently 
enframed in particular constructions of culture. In dismissing a dichotomous 
understanding of religion and culture, I am contending that, while and 
because religion is immersed in culture, culture is necessarily immersed in 
religion. As such, religion and culture are inextricably intertwined in the 
individual, and in the community. Ideas and expressions of religion and 
culture co-exist and co-relate on a continuum, wholly dependent on the 
individual and communal experience and expression thereof. At this point it 
is important to draw attention to my deliberate use of education in Islam, or 
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Islamic education, as opposed to Muslim education. On the one hand my 
decision to draw a distinction between Islamic education and Muslim 
education stems from what Douglas and Shaikh (2004: 8) refer to as the 
poorly nuanced use of the word “Islamic.” They contend that the descriptor 
“Islamic” is often used interchangeably and inconsistently to describe 
doctrines of Islam as well as the practices of Muslims. This description, 
according to Douglas and Shaikh (2004: 5), often fails to take into account 
that which pertains directly to Islam, as in its tenets of faith, as opposed to 
that which its adherents perform in the cultural or social realm, which can be 
categorized more accurately as “Muslim education” (2004: 5). On the other 
hand, the use of Muslim education as opposed to Islamic education is linked 
to Roy’s (2010: 9) questioning of what is understood as a “pure religion,” in 
which there is a demand for a return to explicit religious norms – free from 
any associations with other cultural symbolic systems. Like Roy, I question 
whether it would be possible to understand the Qur’an without taking into 
consideration the historical context in which it was revealed, and thereafter 
propagated. Islamic education in its pure form necessarily would have to be 
quite different from Muslim education – since education itself is given shape 
and meaning by the one who pursues it, thereby always leaving it open to 
interpretation. It therefore would be difficult, contend Davids and Waghid 
(2014: 1490), to consider a conception of knowledge in Islam without 
considering its indelible allegiances to cultural practices informed by both 
revealed and non-revealed sources of education.  
 
2. Muslim Women, Muslim Education and Acculturation 
 
Martin (2000) has combined the terms black and woman – forming 
blackwoman – in order to show the connection between race and gender. 
Similarly, Sherman (2005) has combined the terms black and American – 
forming blackamerican – to show the connection between race and 
citizenship. Following suit, Cooke (2008: 91) constructs the neologism 
“Muslimwoman” to illustrate how the veil, real or imagined, functions like 
race, a marker of essential difference, which Muslim women seemingly 
cannot escape. Muslim woman, explains Cooke (2008: 91), draws attention 
to the emergence of a new, singular religious and gendered identification 
that overlays national, ethnic, cultural, historical and even philosophical 
diversity. She continues that “Muslim women are outsider/insiders within 
Muslim communities where, to belong, their identity increasingly is tied to 
the idea of the veil. As Muslims, they are negotiating cultural 
outsider/insider roles in Muslim-minority societies” (Cooke, 2008: 91). But 
it is not just within their roles in Muslim-minority countries that Muslim 
women struggle to negotiate their cultural outsider/insider roles. Patriarchal 
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constructions of Islam have always tied the establishment of its parameters 
in relation to issues surrounding women. Consequently, dominant debates 
have not been about Muslim men. Instead, they continue to be about women 
in relation to veiling (dress code), marriage, inheritance, divorce, sexuality, 
purity, modesty and education. In post-apartheid South African society, the 
Muslim community has been trapped in hostile exchanges regarding the 
establishment of a Muslim Marriages Bill. The intention of the bill is to 
provide a legal framework that will counter the entrenched inequality to 
which Muslim women continue to be subjected in the event of the 
dissolution of the marriage, or if the husband dies intestate. Previous debates 
centered around the access of women to mosques – commonly referred to as 
the “women in mosques campaign.” 
What both the “women in mosques campaign” and the ongoing campaign 
for the recognition of the Muslim Marriages Bill represent are two stark 
dissimilarities between what is presented by education in Islam, and how 
that education is re-presented when it comes into contact with a particular 
community and culture. The Qur’an, as one of the primary sources of 
education in Islam, advocates, above all else, for equality between men and 
women, accompanied by just action (ikraam) in dealings with all of 
humanity. In reference to chapter 33: 35 if the Qur’an (Surah al-Ahzab), 
which addresses women directly in affirming their equality to men, Ahmed 
(1992: 64) states, “Balancing virtues and ethical qualities, as well as 
concomitant rewards, in one sex with the precisely identical virtues and 
qualities in the other, the passage makes a clear statement about the absolute 
identity of the human moral condition and the common and identical 
spiritual and moral obligations placed on all individuals regardless of sex.” 
Moreover, the Qur’an continuously reminds Muslims that the acquisition of 
goodness (taqwah) ought to be the foundational principle of their education, 
and hence their engagements with others. It therefore would be irrational and 
disingenuous to attempt to substantiate any practices of unjust treatment – 
such as excluding women from access to the mosque, or not affording them 
rights to financial support in the event of divorce or death – on the basis of 
Qur’anic exegeses (tafāsīr). 
Stowasser (1994: 5) describes the centrality of Muslim women in debates 
in and about Islam as symbolic of the primary aspects of “Islamic struggle 
for the maintenance of indigenous values and cultural authenticity.” 
Unfortunately for Muslim women, notions of indigenous values and cultural 
authenticity have been interwoven intricately into very particular 
constructions and, at times, oppressive understandings of domesticity and 
invisibility. In medieval Islam, explains Stowasser (1994: 98), domesticity 
was defined as the “core of female social righteousness, indeed the crucial 
criterion of a Muslim woman’s true citizenship in the community of her 
faith.” In her traditional roles as wife and mother, the Muslim woman, says 
 52 
Stowasser (1994: 7), is not only expected to fight a holy war for the sake of 
Islamic values, in which her conduct, domesticity and dress are vital for the 
survival of the Islamic way of life, but religion, morality and culture stand 
and fall with her. In her representation of the sanctity of Muslim family life, 
and hence society, a Muslim woman’s social role and responsibility are 
inherently linked to moral purpose. In terms of Muslim theology, a Muslim 
woman as mother is considered three times more honorable than a Muslim 
father. This particular honor, in terms of wife and mother and as the 
custodian of family values, modesty and purity, places a Muslim woman at 
the center of both the Islamic religion and Muslim culture. Yet, it would 
appear that the “holy war” Muslim women are expected to fight for the 
“survival of the Islamic way of life” might be at the cost of their own 
individuality. It would appear that, in accepting her centrality as the 
custodian of Islamic values, she has to accept that not only is her designated 
role confined strictly to one of domesticity, but the qualities that afford the 
designation of custodian of Islamic values are the very same qualities that 
ensure her exclusion. What this means is that inasmuch as a Muslim 
woman’s role as wife and mother centralizes her and includes her in the 
custody of Islamic values, her sexuality excludes her from any decision 
making on how her roles and responsibilities ought to be enacted. Stated 
differently, in accepting her inclusion as the custodian of Islamic values by 
virtue of being a Muslim wife and mother, she inadvertently accepts her 
exclusion by virtue of being a Muslim woman.  
Yet, while Islam both designates and recognizes her role and 
responsibility in relation to the preservation of Islamic values – as it does of 
the Muslim male and father – it does not construct this responsibility as 
exclusive of anything that happens outside of the family or home. In other 
words, the preservation of Islamic values is not restricted to a domestic 
understanding thereof. Rather, the preservation of Islamic values necessarily 
relates to the core injunctions of Islamic education – namely the acquisition 
of goodness (taqwah) or virtue. Drawing on Al-Attas’s (1977: 11) 
understanding that Islamic education is about recognizing God so that the 
individual might recognize him- or herself, the purpose, ultimately, is to 
produce a good person. The production of this good person is not context 
bound – it is neither inside nor outside the home, it is neither exclusively 
socially nor exclusively individually based. So, in this sense, Muslim 
education transcends the outsider/insider dichotomy to which Cooke (2008) 
refers, and restores the agency of the individual by virtue of his or her 
autonomous relationship with God, and with others. The transcendence of 
the outsider/insider dichotomy is constituted and cultivated through three 
discernable, yet inter-related, epistemological and ethical practices, namely 
tarbiyyah (socialization), ta’līm (critical engagement), and ta’dīb (social 
activism). These three practices not only provide Muslims with the 
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foundational understandings of their faith, but underscore that 
understandings of faith are inherently couched in the social expression 
thereof.  
The practices of tarbiyyah, ta’līm and ta’dīb, therefore, make it possible 
for Muslims to advance the social responsibility of Islam – which is to enact 
just action. To this end, it becomes clear that the mere acquisition of 
knowledge in Islam does not constitute education. Knowledge in Islam, 
explain Davids and Waghid (2014: 1485), is not differentiated between that 
which is secular and that which is sacred. Knowledge is extracted from two 
distinct knowledge forms, namely “ulum al-aqli” [knowledge of the rational, 
human and sciences] and “ulum al-naqli” [knowledge of the revealed 
sciences], as encapsulated in the primary sources of the Qur’an and the 
Ahādīth [prophetic utterances and conduct]. These two forms of knowledge, 
continue Davids and Waghid (2014: 1485–1486), are not mutually exclusive, 
because in terms of the epistemologies of tarbiyyah (socialization), ta’līm 
(critical engagement) and ta’dīb (social activism), any conceptualization of 
knowledge ought to have intellectual, judgmental and ethical ramifications. 
Knowledge, explains Al-Attas (2005: 23), only becomes education when it is 
accompanied by moral purpose – such as just action. In this sense, Islamic 
education – that is education derived from a deculturated Islam – cannot be 
associated with or used to evoke any form of social injustice, such as the 
exclusion of Muslim women or any other individual. Because it draws its 
meaning from those with whom it interacts, however, and therefore is 
influenced by both the one who pursues it, and in the context in which it is 
lived – whether 7th century Arabia or 21st century South Africa – Muslim 
education is always open to interpretation, and therefore should be open to 
question. 
Thus far I have shown that, unless religion succeeds in completely 
dislodging itself from its surrounding context – thereby depending 
exclusively on religious norms –, it always is given shape by the culture 
through which it finds expression. The implication of this nexus between 
religion and culture is that the Muslim education that Muslim women are 
privy to always will be acculturated. In other words, what distinguishes a 
South African Muslim woman from her Saudi Arabian, Pakistani or British 
counterpart is not her views on the centrality of the Qur’an as the core source 
of Muslim education. Instead, the distinction lives in the interpretation of 
this source – which finds expression in whether she is allowed an education, 
whether she is allowed to speak to non-relative men, whether she is allowed 
to drive a car, or indeed, the extent to which she is expected to veil. These 
aspects, depending on whether the Muslim woman lives in a minority or 
majority Muslim country, will either increase or decrease her visibility. In 
the concluding section of this article I will argue that, in order for Muslim 
women to find a sense of inclusive-belonging, they will need to produce a 
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particular form of knowledge – one that makes a contribution to both 
education and culture.  
 
3. Inclusive Belonging Through Embodied Narration 
 
While issues of dress code, purity, sexuality and modesty have long 
dominated the debates surrounding Muslim women – both in minority and 
majority Muslim countries – little attention has been given to the 
implications of exclusion on a Muslim woman’s sense of belonging within 
her own religious-cultural community. While it might be easier to draw 
attention to the plight of Muslim women through the Muslim Marriages Bill 
or the “women in mosques campaign,” there are other forms of inequality 
that are more intimate, but equally revealing of the disjuncture between 
Muslim women as wife and mother – for whom there might be inclusion, 
and Muslim women as sexual beings – for whom there might be exclusion. 
A study conducted by Hoel and Shaikh (2013), for example, which explored 
the ambivalent religious discourses that inform South African Muslim 
women’s understandings of sex and sexual praxis, highlights how dominant 
religious concepts of sexuality intersect with marital dynamics to produce 
particular forms of female subjectivity. Hoel and Shaikh (2013: 79) found 
that positive views of sexuality in the Muslim tradition are not necessarily 
associated with views that are affirming of women – “Muslim legal and 
social traditions include the belief that a marriage contract legally establishes 
a relationship where a wife is to be constantly available for sex to her 
husband in exchange for maintenance and dower.” Moreover, they conclude 
that Muslim women’s notions of the self are informed by gendered 
understandings of the God-believer relationship, including notions of what 
constitutes worship or devotion (iba-dah). This means that many of the 
women in the study appeared to prioritize male sexual desires over their own 
(Hoel & Shaikh, 2013: 69). It would appear that, in the latter example, the 
Muslim’s woman’s agency submerges into her responsibility as a Muslim 
wife. Her religious responsibility and obedience as a sexually submissive 
wife are embodied and understood in relation to her piety as a Muslim 
woman.  
Belonging, says Yuval-Davis (2011: 12), can take many different forms, 
which not only vary from person to person in a concrete or abstract way, but 
also in a stable, contested or transient way. In clarifying her understanding of 
the notion of social and political belonging, Yuval-Davis (2011: 12) 
differentiates between three major analytical facets in which belonging is 
constructed – which are interrelated but cannot be reduced to each other. The 
first facet of social locations, says Yuval-Davis (2011: 12–13), refers to a 
particular sex, race, class or nation, age group, kinship group, or a certain 
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profession to which people belong. Social locations, she explains, even in 
their most stable format, are virtually never constructed along one power 
vector of difference. The second facet relates to people’s identifications and 
emotional attachments to various collectivities and groupings. For Yuval-
Davis (2011: 14), identities are not just personal, but also collective, and 
collective identity narratives provide a collective sense of order and 
meaning. Crucial to the construction and reproduction of identity narratives 
and constructions of attachment, she continues, are specific repetitive 
practices, relating to specific social and cultural spaces that link individual 
and collective behavior (Yuval-Davis, 2011: 15–16). As such, says Yuval-
Davis (2011: 16), identity is not only constructed in dialogue (that is 
between the individual and others, or the collective), but the dialogical 
construction of identity is both reflective and constitutive – “It is not 
individual or collective, but involves both, in an in-between state of 
‘becoming,’ in which processes of identity construction, authorization, and 
contestation take place.” The third facet relates to ethical and political value 
systems with which people judge their own and others’ belonging. 
Belonging, argues Yuval-Davis (2011: 18), is not just about social locations 
and constructions of individual and collective identities and attachments; it 
also is concerned with the ways these are assessed and valued by the self and 
others. 
The social locations of Muslim women – particularly in Muslim-majority 
countries – have traditionally placed them in the home,  thereby ensuring 
their core responsibilities of domesticity and family. While this might be less 
the case for Muslim women in Muslim-minority countries such as South 
Africa, where Muslim women might be more active outside of the home, 
fulfilling various professional or occupational roles, the likelihood of 
exclusion and discrimination remains. This is so because it is the private 
space of the home in which Muslim women appear to experience the most 
prejudice, and the public sphere might be more prepared to see her as a 
female individual, rather than as a Muslim woman. While collective identity 
narratives might provide a sense of order – as Yuval-Davis argues – this 
order might be both contestable and de-individuating. Collective identity, 
like the power vector of difference inherent in the social locations of Muslim 
women, does not imply collective consensus about that identity. It merely 
implies hegemony of a particular collectivity, which might have succeeded 
in relegating dissensus into subdued silence. This means that, even when 
Muslim women know that they are being excluded or discriminated against 
by Muslim men in their community, they are unlikely to contest it, since 
doing so might lead to further exclusion, because their contestation would be 
viewed as the undermining of an embodied religious understanding, rather 
than a questioning of a culturally-based male-biased interpretation. 
Similarly, while the idea of a dialogical construction of identity is appealing 
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in its spaces of reflexivity, it presupposes an equal opportunity of, and for, 
dialogue. If Muslim women, for example, view their own sexuality as being 
only in service to their husbands, and not in terms of their own identity and 
desires as sexual beings, or if they are left unaccounted for in the event of a 
divorce, then the idea of an equally constructed dialogical construction 
becomes questionable. Both the social locations and dialogical positioning of 
women raise critical questions not only about what exactly excludes Muslim 
women from full participation in their identities as Muslim women, but also 
what Muslim women should do to ensure a sense of inclusive  belonging.  
Of course, the aforementioned discussion raises important questions 
about the role of Muslim women in relation to their own understandings of 
and engagements with the primary sources of Islam. And here one has to 
take note of Wadud’s (2006: 19) criticism that, to the average Muslim 
woman and man, Islam is whatever has been inherited culturally and 
ethically: “Since they are Muslim, they do Islam.” In agreement with 
Wadud, Barlas (2002: 3) contends that unless Muslim women understand the 
liberatory aspects of Qur’anic teachings, they cannot contest the association, 
falsely constructed by misreading scripture, between sacred and sexual 
oppression. Clearly, as has been discussed, a claim of belonging to a 
particular community does not preclude Muslim women from being 
excluded on the basis of particular cultural contexts and understandings. 
What, then, can Muslim women do to find a sense of belonging both as 
religious and cultural beings, since religion and culture, it would appear, 
interplay on a continuum of expression?  
Returning to Yuval-Davis’s (2011: 214–216) understanding of belonging 
in relation to identity: she argues that it is the collective construction of 
identity – related to specific social and cultural spaces – that links individual 
and collective behavior and therefore provides a collective sense of order 
and meaning. This implies that, if the individual and collective behavior are 
not linked, the collective construction of identity probably might not ensue, 
thereby not providing a collective sense of order and meaning. From this it 
can be argued that, if Muslim women wish to belong to a reimagined 
community of full inclusion, they would need to alter their own identity so 
that they might disrupt the collective identity. As such, two premises would 
need to be established. Firstly, Muslim women should take responsibility for 
their own constructions of identity by taking responsibility for their own 
education. This would mean detaching their religious/social/cultural/sexual 
agency from the male bias. It also would mean establishing a new collective 
dialogue with other women so that a new collective identity takes shape, 
which might stand in support of, or in contestation to, an existing (and 
perhaps, dominant) dialogue. With a shift towards a re-imagined collective 
identity – one that is driven by autonomous agency rather than by 
engendered forms of being and action in relation to (male) others – the 
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insecurity of both the collective and the individual dissipates in relation to 
how centrally they construct their identities. If Yuval-Davis (2011: 14) is 
correct in her contention that identity narratives are constructed through 
specific repetitive practices, then it is up to Muslim women – if they wish to 
(re)claim their collective belonging – to restrain these repetitive practices 
through (re)establishing their own practices of fairness, equality and 
inclusion. 
The second premise relates to what it means to belong to a culture, and to 
be acculturated. Inasmuch as culture defines and plays a central role in the 
identities and identity narratives of Muslim women – as it would among any 
other group – cultural discourses, says Yuval-Davis (2011: 115), resemble 
more a battleground for meaning than a shared point of departure. The idea, 
therefore, that ideas and practices are incontestable because they are couched 
in a cultural discourse is a problematic one. That Muslim women in South 
Africa are linked to particular cultures and cultural discourses is evident in 
the heterogeneity of dress codes, wedding rituals,  which vary from a week 
to one day; or the practice of returning to her mother’s home after giving 
birth until she has fully recovered from her post-partum condition. So the 
claim to a culture is indisputable. But, if the Muslim woman is to (re)assert 
her identity and understanding onto this culture, her participation and 
belonging to the culture should be shaped by a duty of individual and 
collective self-criticism. In other words, she should be prepared to criticize 
herself in relation to both her attachment to, and detachment from, her 
culture. This is so because, if culture is meant to signify and transform 
identity, then identity is meant to signify and transform culture. To my mind, 
this is significant because, unlike culture, which is to a large extent defined 
by rituals and traditions, identity by its nature is constitutive of 
transformation. Muslim women, like any other collective, cannot lay claim 
to a stable identity. These identities therefore are perpetually in 
transformation and, if they are constitutive of culture, then culture cannot be 
outside of those through whom it is signified.  
Taking the aforementioned two premises into account, I will now turn my 
attention to the type of knowledge that Muslim women would need to 
produce in order to lay claim to a sense of inclusive-belonging. Given, as I 
have argued, that the Muslim education that Muslim men and women are 
privy to is indeed shaped by religious and cultural discourses, any form of 
knowledge produced by Muslim women therefore also would have to make a 
contribution to both education and culture. Such a contribution would 
necessitate an awareness not only of an understanding and engagement with 
the foundational sources of Islam – namely the Qur’an and Sunnah – but an 
engagement with these sources in relation to the context that the Muslim 
woman finds herself. Her agency, therefore, depends on how well she 
navigates the intersections between Muslim education and culture, and the 
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extent to which she is able both to attach herself to and detach herself from 
either or both. Stated differently, her agency depends on the construction of 
new collective identities and dialogues that are willing to engage in self-
criticism. The type of knowledge that is likely to emerge from such a stance 
is one that takes into account the instability of both religion and culture. It 
takes into account that both religion and culture become what they become 
by virtue of their beliefs and subjectivities. While it is possible to discern 
between that which is sacred and that which is not, or that which is pure 
religion and that which is not, it is not possible to separate the production of 
knowledge into one that is sacred and another that is not. This is so because 
the production of knowledge necessitates human agency, and human agency 
is never sacred; it is always contaminated by bias and culture. This is exactly 
why the Qur’an does not differentiate between sacred and non-sacred 
knowledge. Instead, it distinguishes between knowledge that is beneficial 
and knowledge that is not. To this end, it is as beneficial to Muslim women, 
as it is to Muslim men, as it is to Islam to reconceive the type of knowledge 
that propagates any lines of injustice and exclusion. The Muslim woman’s 
contribution to her Muslim education resides in her critical engagement and 
her willingness to find her voice so that she might express her Muslim 
identity, rather than waiting for it to be defined externally by (male) others. 
Her inclusive-belonging therefore is contingent on her autonomous agency. 
If she is able to engage critically with the foundational sources, her 
engagement itself yields a reimagined type of knowledge. Her contribution 
to her culture lies in both her recognition and disruption thereof. This 
disruption is not only necessary – given the unstable and contested terrain of 
culture – but it is the only way to establish the spaces for new forms of 
knowledge production. These new forms of knowledge will find easy 
expression through the practices of tarbiyyah (socialization), ta’līm (critical 
engagement), and ta’dīb (social activism) – which inherently recognize and 
propagate the understanding of faith as a social expression of responsibility 
to oneself and others.  
In contesting the dichotomous relationship between religion and culture, I 
have shown that religion is always permeated by culture – which means that 
practices, particularly those that lead to exclusion and discrimination, need 
to be contested on both religious and cultural grounds. Laying claim to 
belonging to a community does not translate into full participation or 
inclusion – depending on who controls the hegemonic discourse, belonging 
shifts from the center to the periphery. Following this, I have argued that if 
Muslim women desire a sense of inclusive-belonging, they would need to 
enact their belonging through taking responsibility for and engendering 
agency in their own religious and cultural identities. Thus, any form of 
knowledge produced by Muslim women therefore would need to be both 
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